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Modelling interactions between State and Private sector in a "previously " 
Centrally Planned Economy*
Paola Valbonesi
European University Institute - Firenze
Abstract: I model the impact of entry on market performance when a market is 
dominated by a former monopolist inherited from a previously centrally planned 
system. An oligopoly model is developed to analyze a market where one Large 
State Firm and a set of Small Private Firms produce a homogeneous good. Further 
extentions of the model investigate product differentiation and budget constraint.
* I wish to thank Prof. Steven Martin for helpful guidance through out the writing of the paper. But, of course, 























































































































































































In the present work I focus on market performance during a transitional phase in 
which an economy is no longer a Centrally Planned Economy (CPE) but has not yet 
become a market economy. My aim is to investigate how state and private firms 
producing similar goods compete within a market where economic mechanisms of the 
old command system have been abolished and reforms have been implemented to 
promote market instruments and the "creation" of market actors.
In what follows I model three specific features of these markets.
The first considers the historic monopolistic position of state firms; as a consequence 
it is assumed that the state firm here investigated is a price-maker.
The second refers to the persistent shortages affecting these economies in the past and 
which - nowadays - could be seen as an incentive for new private firms to enter the 
market.
The third is related to the soft budget constraint sometimes faced by state firms during 
the transitional phase; what matters here is whether this budget constraint is relevant 
with respect to the presence of private firms in the market.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in section 2 the model is 
developed to analyse a market where one Large State Fipn (LSF) and n Small Private 
Firms (SPFs) produce a homogeneous good q.
The LSF maximises profit along a residual demand curve. Following Alexeev (1987), 
the consumer demand for the product q of the LSF depends on a "full price" that 
includes waiting time. The LSF sets a price which does not clear the market: n SPFs 
enter the market and pick an output which maximises profits.
Given the LSF's optimisation problem, I focus on the determination of n .
In section 3 n is then related to a parameter d  of product differentiation.
I conclude with section 4 where the analysis is extended to investigate the budget 




























































































remains affected by a form of "soft budget constraint" in the way depicted by Komai1: 
if the firm makes a loss, some sort of subsidy, bailout credit, or tax exemption is 
provided by the central government.
The private firm is instead characterised by a "hard budget constraint" which means 
that its survival depends exclusively on the proceeds from its sales and on the costs of 
inputs; moreover, the private firm is unable to influence the price.
The impact of soft and hard budget constraints faced by the LSF on the number of 
SPFs present are then compared to point out how these constraints affect equilibrium 
market shares.
2 Residual Demand Analysis
In this first model the interactions between the LSF’s price and the SPF’s price 
through the analysis of the state firm’s residual demand are considered.
Consumers are free to buy the good q from the SPF or from the LSF. Consumers are 
indifferent between one unit of good q from a private firm immediately and 0 +vv) 
units from the state firm, where w  is the opportunity cost of expected waiting time 
for a unit of good to be delivered by the LSF. A representative utility function with 
these characteristics is:
(1) u = m + a ( x T,q ) - j b { x T^
where x  j  indicates the total quantity of good q and the numéraire m  represents all 
the other goods.
Let us denote by XS the quantity purchased from the LSF and X P the quantity 
purchased from the SPF; then
(2) X t  --
1 ’<7 1 + w
-  +  X l




























































































The formulation chosen for X j  - the total amount of good q desired by the
consumer - is related to Alexeev’s2 theoretical model of individual behaviour under the 
dualism of the official and parallel retail markets for agricultural products in Soviet 
Union.
Alexeev (1987) models a situation in which the good considered can be bought either 
in the first market or in the parallel one. The first market price is fixed below the 
market-clearing level and the consumers have to spend on average t hours in a queue 
for each unit of the good they want to buy. The parallel market price is flexible, 
market-clearing and gives immediate availability of the good purchased.
For the first market price, Alexeev introduces the concept of “full price”, which 
incorporates the consumer’s queuing time t  for each unit of good and its monetary 
value w .  In this way, Alexeev analyses the consumer behaviour based on the 
relationship between
p  j + w ‘t  and p  2
where w ‘ is the consumer’s marginal value of time, P\ is the first market price and 
p 2 is the parallel market price.
Obviously those consumers for whom p l +  w ‘t < would prefer to shop in the 
first market, while those for whom p \  + w lt > p j  would opt for the parallel one.
In our model of homogeneous goods, if positive amounts of both goods are
consumed, then p j +  w ‘t  must be equal to p 2-
Coming back to our analysis and substituting (2) into (1) we get:
(3) u = m + a \ - X ^ - + X p \ - h b \  Xs +Xp
Vl + vv J  z U  + w
^Alexeev M.,(1987): “Microeconomic modelling of parallel markets: the case of agricultural 




























































































The Lagrangian for constrained utility maximisation is:
(4> 2
£ = m + a \ - ^ - + x P + ] + X ( y - m - p sx s - p Px P)
Vl +  vy )  2  v l  +  w' J
where ( y  -  m  — p$X s — p PX P) is the consumer’s budget constraint, y  is the 
consumer's income, p P and p$  are the prices set by the SPF and by the LSF 
respectively.
If I consider the interior solution3 in which x P >  0  and > 0  , then
(4. a) i i  = l - A  = 0 A =  1
dm
(4.b) = — b x P -  X ( \ + w ) p s = 0  and
d x s 1 +  w
d £  bxc  , , .
(4.c) —— - a -------- -— b x P - A p P = 0  .
ox  P 1 + w
It follows that a necessary relationship between prices is:
(5) / V = ( l  +  w )p s
which depends on the assumption that all firms have positive sales in the long run 
considered. This is a specific version of Alexeev’s result comparing prices on dual 
markets.
3The comer solution Xp=0would involve entry deterring behavior by the incumbent, of the 
kind studied in the literature on limit pricing and predatory behaviour. It seems unlikely that 
public authorities in transition economies would permit such behaviour. The corner 
solution*^ =0 would describe situations in which the former state monopolist was so 
inefficient that competition from small private firms drives it out from the market. While such 
markets may well exist in practice, their analysis would take me away from the topic of this 




























































































From (4.b) and (4.c) we obtain the (inverse) demand function for q which is:
(6.a) p P = ( l  + w ) p s = a - b \  - ^ -  + x P
Vl +  vv
Let
(7) ='1+w
so that (6.a) can be rewritten as
(6.b) P p ^ + w ) P s = a - b ( x s * + x P) .
It follows that the equation for the LSFs residual demand is:
(8)
,  [a -( l+ w )ps ] 
x  c —-------- :-----------x  i
which is expressed in terms of market demand function and of SPF's demand (X P) 
for good q .
Now suppose there is a set of n SPFs who sell the same product q, acting as Cournot 
oligopolists. Each SPF chooses its level of output ( x P) so as to maximise profit. 
Supposing the SPFs linear cost function to be
(9) c ( x p . )  = CXp. + F
- where F  stands for fixed costs - and recalling (6.b), the profit of a single SPF can 
be expressed as follow
































































































a-c-k{xs* + Y >j=ix pj +xPi)
Since the SPF's have identical cost functions and behave in the same way, in 
equilibrium they will produce identical outputs:
(12) x  Px =x p2 =...-x pn - X  P ■
This permits us to write the condensed SPF reaction function as
a - c
(13.a) x s +(n+l)xP =-
or
(13.b)
„ 1 f a - c  i
n + l l  b s
Recalling (6.b), the presence of n SPFs transforms the LSF's residual demand 
function as:
(14) (1+ w )p s= a -b [ x s *+ nxP)
and combining (13.b) in the previous (14) we get
a - c - b x s *
(15) (l+w)ps =c+-
n +1
We can now work out the LSF's optimisation problem with respect to its residual 






























































































Substituting (15) we get:
(17) 7CS - C+
a - c - b x r
(«+ !)
-(l+ tv )cU 5*
Taking the derivative of (17) with respect to XS and solving the resulting first order 
condition, we get the LSFs profit maximising output:
(18)
_  1 |a - [ l+ ( n + l) w ] c |
which depends on a, b , c,  w and n .
It is now interesting to focus on the determination of the number of SPFs which share 
the market for good q with the LSF.
Suppose that n adjusts so that ftp = 0 , which means that SPFs would enter the 
market until the profit of each private firm is driven to 0. Thus we have
(19.a) ftp —b
1 (  a - c -i2
- F = 0


































































































Looking to (19.c), we can observe that n is an increasing function of w  which 
means that the higher the opportunity cost of expected waiting time is for a unit of 
good to be delivered by the LSF, the larger the number of SPFs entering the market. 
Combining (19.b) into the previous (15), we get the long run equilibrium price
(21) p P=(\+ w)ps= c+ 'JbF
3 Product Differentiation Analysis
We now modify the previous model to examine how product differentiation affects 
market performance - or more precisely - how it affects the number of SPFs coming 
into the market for good q.
The parameter 0  measures the degree of product differentiation: its value can lie 
between 0 and 1. If 0  = 0 , products are completely differentiated and each producer 
is a monopolist for its own brand; if 0  = 1, products are completely homogeneous 




























































































With this notation, a quadratic representative utility function is
(22) u - m + a  — + r «  Ì—Vl+w P)
t e - i  + 2 e^ +Xp2
Vl+wJ 1+w P
The Lagrangian for constrained utility maximisation is: 
(23)
t= /n + a ^ xs I-  )_ b
1+w +Xp)  2
( - & - )  +2 0 ^ L +Xp2
U+wJ 1+w P
+ \ [ Y - m- p sxs - p PxP\
From the first order conditions (assuming interior solutions) we get
A=1-p -= l-A =0
dm
d£ _ a 
dxs 1 + w
and
<?£
^ .....+ e -  Xp
(l + w)"1 (1 + w)
-  Ap s -  0
dx 1
- = a - b 0 Xs + x P 
(1 + w)
-  Xpp  = 0
from which we obtain the inverse demand curves:
(24.3) P s = J ^ ^ L a - b {x s + 6 x r ) \
and




























































































Proceeding in the same way as in the homogeneous product model, we derive the 
residual demand curve of the large state firm.
The profit maximisation problem of n SPFs becomes now
(25.a) KP . - a - c - - F
where the profit maximising quantity is
(25.b) xPi - a - c - b ^ O x s ' + Y ^ X p j )
and on the n SPFs reaction function we get 
(26.a) .........................  a - C
6 x s * + ( n  + l ) x P =
(26.b) n x P = —  —  - 0 x s 
P m + 1 V b S
which represents the total output of all SPFs as a function of x  *.
The LSFs residual demand curve in a market affected by product differentiation 
becomes
(27) ( l  +  w)/?5 =
, 1+(1 - 0 ) n ,  x l +  ( l - 0 2 )/t ,
c + — -— T-1— ( a - c ) - b -  '  ~
n + 1 n + 1
The LSFs profit is
(28) 7Tr =  i -W C  +





























































































which is maximised for
(29)
,  _  [1 +  ( 1 -  G ) n \ ( a - c ) - { n  + l )w c  
2fe[l +  ( l - 0 2 )/t]
We focus now on the relation between product differentiation and the number of 
SPFs.
Recalling (26.a) and (24.b), p P could also be expressed as follow
(30) p P = c  + b x P
which permit us to write the SPFs profit
(31.a) K p = ( p P - c ) x P -  F  = b ( x P )2 —F
Substituting (29) in (26.b) we get
1 [ 2 - 0  + ( l -0 )(2  + 0)w].S
(32) x P =
0  wc
H +  l 2 [l +  ( l - 0 2 )n] 2 [ l + ( l - 0 2 )n ] b
Suppose n adjusts so that n P -  0; the profit maximisation problem of n SPFs in a 
market with product differentiation is
(31.b)
1 l [2-e+(\-e)(2+e)n]s { ( )W c }  If




























































































Solving the previous (31.b) for (n  + 1 ) we get 
(33)
2 0 2J ^ - ( l - 8 X 2 + 0 ) S - 6 ^
(n+l)=-------------- j=------------------±4Vf(‘-e") _
Only the plus sign in the numerator need be considered. A numerical simulation gives 
a clear picture of the relation between the number of SPFs and product differentiation 
(8 ) ,  fixed costs (F ), and opportunity cost of expected waiting time (w ) 
respectively.
The three different cases are here investigated keeping constant values for a , b, c,  
and m  and assigning reasonable values to the parameters 8 t F ,  and w (See the 
Appendix for more details about the simulation).
The number of SPFs is positively affected by the opportunity cost of expected waiting 
time: as w  increases, ( n + 1 ) increases.
Considering fixed costs, it can be observed that ( n + 1 ) is a decreasing function of
F .
In the case of product differentiation, the number of SPFs entering the market is 
higher the greater the product differentiation but only until 0  = 3 /4  (see Tab.l). 
Coming back to the previous (31.b) and focusing on its partial derivatives, I found 
that the value of w  is relevant to the sign of the whole function when 0  assumes 
values near to 1.
The problem now is to determine what could be a reasonable value for w . In my view 
w  should be somehow related to the firm's cost since it is a sort of cost as well but 
for the consumer. For this reason I performed the simulation assuming - as basic case 
. w = 11 /  4 t given c = 2 and F  = 4.

































































































In Tab. 2 numerical solutions of (33) are provided with respect to different values of 
0  and as w  changes. As w  increases the interval where (ri +  1) is positively 
affected by the product differentiation becomes progressively smaller. This result is 
shown as well as by the graphical representations which follow the numerical 
simulation in the Appendix.
While performing the simulation, however, a new insight has been gained to the 
whole issue: the resulting consumer's Net Welfare has been investigated with respect 
to product differentiation, fixed costs and the opportunity cost of expected waiting 
time.
The results obtained highlight on the one hand that the consumer’s Net Welfare 
decreases as product differentiation decreases and as fixed costs increase; on the other 
hand it increases as the opportunity cost of expected waiting time decreases (see 
Tab.l, 3, 4). It comes that the consumer is better off when product differentiation is 
present in the market and when “queuing time” disappears.
4 Budget Constraint Analysis
In this section we introduce the budget constraint analysis to the model.
Such budget constraints have been investigated by J. Komai (1980) who recognised it 
as one of the key differences between capitalist and socialist firms along with resource 
constraints and demand constraint4.
Whereas a capitalist firm nearly always faces a hard budget constraint, the 
corresponding constraint for a socialist firm tends to be soft. In Kornai's analysis four 
conditions contribute to the softness of the constraint for a state enterprise:
1) price-making, in the sense that sooner or later enterprises are able to pass cost 
increases on to customers;
2) a soft tax system, in which the enterprise is able to negotiate special rates or 
exemptions, or to influence the formulation of tax rules;
4Wilh respect to these last two items, Kornai underlined in his work that under capitalist 
conditions it is demand constraints that normally limit production while under socialism it is the 




























































































3) free state grants available to enterprises for a variety of purposes;
4) a soft credit system, with loans only loosely related to future sale revenue and with 
only mild repayment conditions and/or weak penalties for non repayment 
Obviously under these conditions - which can hold to a different extent in different 
countries or at different times - the survival of a state firm depends hardly at all on its 
ability to cover all its cost out of its sales proceeds since grants, subsidies, bailouts, 
tax favours etc. can be negotiated to fill the gap.
It follows that the softness of the budget constraint which characterises socialist firms 
is an important feature in the evaluation of the transition toward a market economy 
and, moreover, in the analysis of interaction with the growing private sector.
In this section we generalise the previous model - where one LSF and n SPFs were 
sharing the market for good q - to make bankruptcy possible and to model the impact 
of a soft budget constraint.
First of all we suppose the market inverse demand function has a stochastic intercept 
a , taking a high (aH) or low (a L ) value with probability / l  and ( l - / i )
respectively. Whether demand is high or low in a given period of time is unknown in 
advance by LSF and SPFs, while f l  is known to LSF and to SPFs.
This means that
(34) E (a )  = HKH + (  l - n ) n L .
LSF and SPFs must pick output before they know the realised value of the market 
demand - that means before they know if a  is high or low. The LSF and SPFs pick 
their own output to maximise their own expected profit.
Two cases will be considered: one where LSF is affected by a "hard budget 
constraint" and the other where LSF faces a "soft budget constraint".
In both the cases SPFs come into the market for good q until their expected profits are 
zero.
The expected profit of a generic SPF will now be




























































































where, recalling (10), we have
(36) 71 „  = {[a„  - c - b i x s "  + xP. +...+xPn )]xP. - f } 
and
(37) kl = {[aL - c - b ( x s* +Xp.+...+Xpn)\xpi - f } .
The first order condition is
(38) ■jjp- = [^ (a )- c - b [ x j* + 2xP. +...+xPn )] = 0 .
Pi
The (38) gives us the SPF profit maximising output, which can be written in 
condensed form as
(39) x P =
(E ( o ) - c ) 1
(« + !)
The residual demand curve of LSF - in presence of n SPFs - becomes
(40) (l + w)/?5
[£(a)-fej:s, ] - c
(»+ l )
Acting as a Stackelberg leader, the LSF maximises expected profit along the residual 
demand curve. LSFs expected profit is:
(41) 7Cc =
E( a) - c  , ,, c »




























































































which is maximised for
(42)
Considering the number of SPFs, when LSF faces a hard budget constraint, the 
previous (19.c) becomes
Moving now to the case where LSF faces a soft budget constraint and recalling (36) 
and (37), the problem of the firm is:
In the case of a hard budget constraint to a low demand function ( a ; ) it will 
correspond to a negative profit ( KL < 0); while in the case of a soft budget constraint 
- given the bailout credit provided by the central government - to (aL) it will result in 
a profit equal to zero ( KL = 0 ) .  Whenever the LSF makes losses, the government 
covers them.
The inverse demand function is now
(43)
(44) max H7t„ + ( l - / t ) ( 0 )




























































































and considering (34) and (39) we get
(46) (1+w)ps = a H-b
* n (naH+{\-H]aL -c  _
' «+i L. XSl  b J]
The LSFs expected profit is 
(47)
E ( n s )  = v { P s ~ c ) x s =
_ pb \ ( n + \ ) { \ - n ) { a H - a L)wc ' nan + ( \ - n ) a L - c  ,1 .
(« + D I  b b 5 \  S
which is maximised for
(48)
= 2
H a „ + { \ - n ) a L - c
- (n  + l)w -  +
b (l-ju )(n  +  l)|
a , ,  - a ,
Focusing on the determination of the number of SPFs sharing the market for good q 
with the LSF affected by a soft budget constraint we consider the previous (43) where 
the LSF maximising output is substituted by (48) and we get:
(49) (« +  ^SoftB.C.
E ( a ) - c
b
« a  -  <*l
Comparing (49) with the previous (43) we should highlight that in the presence of a 
LSF facing a soft budget constraint the number of SPFs is lower than in presence of a 





























































































In this paper I have studied the impact of small private firms on a market initially 
dominated by one large state firm in a previously Centrally Planned Economy.
I considered a model which allows us to investigate a LSF behaving as a Stackelberg 
leader and n SPFs playing Cournot.
For the analysis on residual demand (section 2) the main result is that increasing the 
LSF's "full price” - which includes the opportunity cost of expected waiting time - the 
number of SPFs entering the market increases. In these circumstances, the number of 
private firms producing a homogeneous good is increased by the persistence in the 
market of queuing time in acquisition of commodities. Shortages should encourage the 
entry of SPFs in the market.
In addition, considering product differentiation (section 3), under specific conditions 
given by the numerical simulation performed, the greater the differentiation of the 
good, the larger the number of SPFs entering the market.
The budget constraint analysis (section 4) shows that if the LSF faces a soft budget 
constraint the number of SPFs is lower than with a LSF facing a hard budget 
constraint. In the environment considered, where reforms to create conditions for a 
decentralised market system are being implemented, it is more desirable5 that a LSF 
faces a hard budget constraint, since this leads to a larger number of small private 
firms and, consequently, to higher competition6.
A last remark is in order. In this paper we dealt with a LSF maximising profit; this 
assumption is not at all obvious since the objective function of a state firm is 
controversial.
5The concept of desirability expressed in this statement refers to the objectives of the 
transitional phase in Central and Eastern economies among which the implementation of market 
competition assumes a relevant role. The social impact of the dynamics considered above have 
not been investigated here. Moreover, I should here stress that this conclusion comes from a 
partial equilibrium setting and it may not be true in a general equilibrium setting.
6Thc last statement could be correlated with some feedback which are beyond the scope of the 
present paper. In fact, soft and hard budget constraint have different influence on delays in 
production and shortages in supply. Such feedback may foster fundamental rethinking of the 




























































































The usual approach7 states that state firm is social welfare maximising. Our choice 
relates to the transitional phase of the economy, when the creation of market actors 
and the acquisition of market rules are being followed up and where a lot of large state 
firms are touched by the privatisation process which induces the state firm itself to 
maximise profit. In the light of these considerations, our assumption seems to be 
justified.
7see: Cremer H., Marchand M., Thisse J.F., (1989): "The public firm as an instrument for 
regulating an oligopolistic market", Oxford Economic Papers, 41, pp. 283-301; and De Fraja 
G., Delbono F., (1989): "Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly", Oxford 




























































































Appendix -  Numerical Simulation
The numerical simulation presented here investigates the number of SPFs coming in 
the market and the consumer's Net Welfare. In each case the behaviour of three key 
variables is described: the parameter of product differentiation (9 ) ,  the fixed costs 
(F), and the opportunity cost of expected waiting time (w ).
The results from the following numerical simulation are performed assuming constant 
values for a , b, c and m .
The number of SPFs is analysed evaluating the previous (33) and considering the only 
positive root:
The consumer's Net Welfare is measured through the equation of the consumer's 
utility function minus the costs of production (these last correspond to the costs faced 
by (n  + 1 ) SPFs and the LSF to produce their output):




b  (  x s





























































































Setting F=A and w = ll/4 , Table 1 shows how the number of SPFs and the 
consumer's Net Welfare are affected by the parameter of product differentiation Q.
In Table 2, 1 focus on the relation between (n + 1 ) SPFs and 0 ,  as w  changes. 
Table 3 and Table 4 describe how the number of SPFs and the consumer's Net 
Welfare are sensitive to different value of F and w respectively.
Tables
Tab. 1 - 0 = (1/10, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 7/8,9/10, 11/12); F  = 4; w = 11/4 =2,75
Constant Parameters:
a  =  56  
b = 1 
c = 2 
m = 0
0  = 1/10 0  = 1/8 0  = 1/4 0  = 1/2 0=3/4 0  = 7/8 0=9/10 0  = 11/12
(n + 1) 25,91 25,67 24,64 23,28 23,04 24,38 25,14 25,90
Net
Welfare
2061.97 2023.96 1855.71 1603.86 1427.91 1365.89 1357.35 1353.52
Tab. 2 - 0 = (1/10, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 9/10, 11/12); F = 4; w = (0, 1, 11/4,
10, 100, 1000)
Constant Parameters: 
a -  56 
b = 1 
c = 2 
m =0
ie=0 w =  1 «-=11/4 H-=10 H>=100 H'  =  1 0 0 0
0  =  1/10 25,77 25,81 25,91 26,27 30,82 76,27
0 = 1/8 25,49 25,56 25,67 26,12 31,84 88,98
0=1/4 24,27 24,40 24,64 26,10 37,59 157,57
0 = 1/2 22,37 22,70 23,28 25,67 55,58 355,12
0 = 3/4 20,75 21,58 23,04 29,1 105,81 877,09
0 = 7/8 19,67 21,36 24,37 37,28 204,31 1239,96
0 = 9/10 19,32 21,40 25,14 41,41 253,41 2384,79





























































































a = 56 
6 =  1 
c = 2
Tab. 3 - 9 = 1/2; F  = (4, 64, 144, 400, 1600); w = 11/4
F=4 F=64 F=144 F=400 F=1600
(n+1) 23,28 5,72 3,77 2,21 1,05
Net Welfare 1603.86 267.06 -1515.34 -7219.02 -33955
TV*. 4 - 6 = 1/2; F  = 4; w = (0, 1, 11/4, 10, 100, 1000)
Constant Parameters: 
a  = 56 
b = 1 
c = 2  
m = 0
iv=0 *>=1 k>=11/4 *>=10 H’=100 10=1000
22,37 22,53 23,28 25,67 55,58 355,51






























































































h> =0, 1 > 8 > 0
(« +1)
w=i, i > e > o




























































































w = 11/4. i  > e  > o
( » + i )
h’=io, i > e > o




























































































w=100, i  > e > o
( »+ i )
»-=1000, 1 > 9 > 0
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